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HIV Goals with Injecting Drug Users: The Case of
Pakistan
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Hina Khalid1* , Ashley M. Fox2
Abstract
Background: The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) has recently set the ambitious “90-90-90
target” of having 90% of people living with HIV (PLHIV) know their status, receive antiretroviral therapy (ART), and
achieve viral suppression by 2020. This ambitious new goal is occurring in a context of global “scale-down” following
nearly a decade of heightened investment in HIV prevention and treatment efforts. Arguably international goals spur
action, however, setting unrealistic goals that do not take weak health systems and variations in the nature of the
epidemic across countries into consideration may set them up for failure in unproductive ways that lead to a decline
in confidence in global governance institutions. This study explores how policy actors tasked with implementing
HIV programs navigate the competing demands placed upon them by development targets and national politics,
particularly in the current context of waning international investments towards HIV.
Methods: To examine these questions, we interviewed 29 key informants comprising health experts in donor
organizations and government employees in HIV programs in Pakistan, a country where HIV programs must compete
with other issues for attention. Themes were identified inductively through an iterative process and findings were
triangulated with various data sources and existing literature.
Results: We found both political and governance challenges to achieving the target, particularly in the context of the
global HIV scale-down. Political challenges included, low and heterogeneous political commitment for HIV and a
conservative legal environment that contributed towards a ban on opiate substitution therapy, creating low treatment
coverage. Governance challenges includedstrained state and non-governmental organization (NGO) relations creating
a hostile service delivery environment, weak bureaucratic and civil society capacity contributing to poor regulation of
the health infrastructure, and resource mismanagement on both the part of the government and NGOs.
Conclusion: Our findings suggest that in a context of waning international attention to HIV, policy actors on the
ground face a number of practical hurdles to achieving the ambitious targets set out by international agencies. Greater
attention to the political and governance challenges of implementing HIV programs in low- and middle-income
countries (LMICs) could help technical assistance agencies to develop more realistic implementation plans.
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Key Messages
Implications for policy makers
•
Epidemic control will be difficult to achieve as long as there is poor governance of the health system and low political support for HIV.
•
For successful service delivery through contracts, the government and civil society will need to work towards improving the governance of
contracts.
•
Taking a more horizontal approach to service delivery, versus focusing on vertical programs, can help in improving health outcomes with
reference to HIV and general health.
Implications for the public
With waning global attention to HIV, vulnerable populations face increased obstacles to receiving care and treatment as governments fail to prioritize
HIV and the behaviors that fuel it. Injecting drug use, the main mode of HIV transmission in the country is treated as a criminal act rather than a
medical condition. Reduced HIV stigma and discrimination, through greater awareness and advocacy, can help people living with HIV (PLHIV)
lead lives as equal citizens of society.

Full list of authors’ affiliations is available at the end of the article.
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Background
The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS) has set a number of goals since the early years of
the HIV epidemic including the 3 by 5 initiative (get 3 million
people on antiretrovirals [ARVs] by 2005),1 the 15 by 15
target (getting 15 million people on treatment by 2015)2 and
the Getting to Zero strategy (zero new infections by 2015).3
More recently, UNAIDS has set an ambitious goal of having
90% of all people living with HIV (PLHIV) to know their
status, receive antiretroviral therapy (ART), and achieve viral
suppression by 2020, otherwise known as the 90-90-90 target.4
This ‘treatment as prevention’ approach is being emphasized
because of recent evidence of reduced risk of transmission
from individuals who are virally suppressed.5
To meet this new target many countries will have to rapidly
scale-up HIV service delivery in an environment where there
is a decline in donor funding for HIV.6 Following an era of
high HIV funding, with the largest annualized percentage
change recorded between 2000-2010, development assistance
for HIV is being scaled down. Between 2014 to 2015,
donor funding for HIV decreased by 13% ($8.62 to $7.53
billion).6 The decline in donor funding is the outcome of
several interrelated factors: an appreciation of the dollar,
accompanied by a depreciation of donor currencies; a delay
in contributions by the United States, the largest contributor
towards development assistance for HIV; and front-loaded
contributions to the Global Fund by donors.6 In spite of
scale-down, in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs),
HIV continues to remain one of the most heavily funded
sectors. The ratio of government spending to development
assistance for HIV in these countries is twenty times higher
as compared to the ratio of development assistance for health
to government spending.7 Therefore, PLHIV in LMICs, will
be among those who are the hardest hit by these funding
cuts as there is heavy reliance on development assistance for
funding HIV programs, making these countries susceptible to
fluctuations in development assistance.7
While HIV funding remains an important source of
revenue for health systems in LMICs, previous research has
revealed the perverse effects stemming from the decade long
donor infusions of HIV specific funding. These include the
vertical nature of HIV funding, which focused narrowly on
getting “drugs into bodies”8 without attention to the broader
need to strengthen health systems to deliver care and primary
healthcare.9-12 Likewise, the exceptional nature of the HIV
response led to a misalignment between the actual health
needs of countries and the AIDS-specific funding provided
to LMICs, often leading countries to position themselves as
suffering from HIV at the expense of other, more pressing
health concerns.9 Although prominent studies have found
that HIV funding has not necessarily “crowded out” donors’
support for other health programs13 due to overall increases
in global aid,14 there is increasing evidence that the narrow,
vertical basis of HIV funding has created unintended
consequences that have weakened already fragmented health
systems.15 For instance, HIV-specific funding has been argued
to have affected the health work force, pulling the limited
number of well-trained health workers into better paid
262

positions in AIDS non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and out of the public sector, compounding health worker
shortages in LMICs.16,17 In addition to the misalignment of
priorities precipitated by the rapid increase in dedicated
HIV spending, research has identified the principal-agent
problems created by the misaligned incentives between
donors and local communities. Local officials, the agents,
face competing pressures from donors (external principals)
who provide funding for HIV interventions and the people
whom they represent (local principals). While external
principals prioritize HIV interventions, local principals are
often more interested in addressing other pressing health and
development concerns. Misalignment of priorities creates
pressures on agents for implementing the global goals.11
While some credit global targets such as the 90-90-90
with developing common goals that spur action and channel
effort among governments,18-20 others are more skeptical
of global consensus documents that lack enforceability
mechanisms. For instance, Easterly argues that the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) are unactionable, unquantifiable,
with almost all aspects of development occupying a top
priority, and no concrete commitment of funding to meet
the goals.21 Others echo his concerns in arguing that the
goals are not well developed, have contradictory trade-offs,
and countries with low sustainable development indicators
face a bigger challenge in achieving these goals.22,23 Moreover,
while treatment as prevention is a promising approach to
reducing HIV transmission that does not require behavior
change interventions, which have been shown to be relatively
ineffective, others have criticized this approach, noting that
this bio-medicalization of prevention efforts has a perverse
effect on HIV activism, rights-based prevention and structural
interventions.24,25 It is also argued that people in poorer
countries only have access to the cheapest cocktail drugs that
can have harmful consequences. Finally, the combination of
funding cuts and propagation of biomedical methods has led
to a health workforce which is overworked and disillusioned.15
As countries embark on achieving the new 90-90-90 HIV
targets, research does not fully enumerate the challenges
developing countries might face in achieving these targets,
and the new target’s potential impact on countries’ overall HIV
response. This study aimed to explore how different policy
actors were navigating the challenges posed by the evolving
global HIV response in a country with a conservative climate
towards HIV, a large injecting drug user (IDU) population,
and competing health sector priorities.
Setting
Pakistan is an important case to study in the context of HIV
scale-down in that, like many LMICs, it represents a country
with a weak domestic political commitment to HIV and a
tepid policy response. While heightened global attention
to HIV may have temporarily bolstered the response in an
otherwise weakly committed country, the scale-down of
resources is likely to affect the response even more profoundly
as there is little political support for the issue.26,27 In contrast
with countries with generalized epidemics, in Pakistan
HIV prevalence remains low (less than 0.1% of the adult
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population), and is concentrated among IDUs.28 In 2011, the
estimated number of IDUs in Pakistan was 46 351 and the
HIV sero-prevalence among them was 37.8%.29 These rates
are much higher than the overall global prevalence of HIV
among IDUs (13.1%),30 and consequently, most funding and
attention has gone towards addressing HIV in this highly
marginalized and unorganized population. However, in
the absence of global attention, this group remains highly
vulnerable.
Pakistan’s HIV response is best described as tepid. There
is high disease stigma,31 no stated commitment by heads of
state regarding HIV32 and budgetary commitment to address
the disease remains very low. In 2015, the contribution of
international and domestic sources for HIV program activities
was $6.36 million and $3.63 million respectively.33 On the
policy side, needle exchange programs are prohibited by law,
but are still allowed to operate in the country.34 However,
opioid substitution therapy is not allowed in the country.35 In
terms of offering protection to PLHIV in terms of employment
and discrimination, Sindh, is the only province that has
currently passed a bill to protect PLHIV, however it has not
translated it into effective implementation.36 For the other 3
provinces, legislation does not directly protect PLHIV from
discrimination at work or in acquiring work. According to a
recent report by United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), there might be some protection available to PLHIV
under the Disabled Person Ordinance, 1981, as it reserves at
least 1% of employment within a province for people with
some disease or health condition. Yet, it is unclear if PLHIV
benefit from the Disabled Person Ordinance.37 HIV treatment
and prevention efforts are further complicated by Pakistan’s
recent experience with devolution, in the presence of a weak
health system.38 In 2011, the Ministry of Health was dissolved
and health policy formation and planning was devolved
to the provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber
Pukhtoonkhwa). With devolution in 2011, HIV program
administrators have had to perform expanded functions, such
as developing their own context-specific strategies and action
plans.39 Other challenges faced by the health system include, a
weak coordinating authority at the federal level, capacity and
implementation constraints, and inadequate interprovincial
information sharing.40 Pakistan also suffers from low overall
health system capacity. Health in general remains a low
priority for the government- the government of Pakistan
spends approximately 0.5% of its gross domestic product
(GDP) on health.41 In 2013-2014, total health expenditure
was Rs. 757 billion ($6.2 billion), out of which Rs. 243 billion
($1.99 billion) was spent by the public sector and Rs. 508
billion ($4.17) by the private sector.42
In terms of global pressure, HIV is a sector with heavy
foreign involvement. International donor organizations are
the largest source of revenue for HIV prevention, treatment
and care in the country. The involvement of major donor
organizations has changed over time based on shifts in the
donor landscape. From 2003-2009, HIV program activities
were shaped by the World Bank, through a partnership
between the World Bank and the national and provincial HIV
programs (the Enhanced HIV/AIDS Control Program).43

With the withdrawal of the World Bank in 2010, the Global
Fund[1] became the main financer of HIV related efforts.
In 2015 it committed approximately $27.7 million for HIV
efforts in Pakistan for 3 years. The highest spending is on
prevention activities (IDUs are the largest focus of HIV
prevention activities),33 followed by care and treatment.
Services to HIV high-risk populations are provided through
collaboration between the implementing partners of the
Global Fund,44 which for Pakistan are the national AIDS
Control program, the provincial AIDS Control programs,
and NGOs.45 NGOs are hired on contracts by the provincial
AIDS Control programs through a competitive bidding
process.46 These NGOs provide needles to IDUs through
needle exchange programs and in doing so are at the forefront
of harm reduction interventions in the country.
Consequently, local forces (the politically contentious
nature of HIV, the country’s recent experience with
devolution, and high HIV disease burden among IDUs)
and international forces (Pakistan’s place among the high
impact HIV countries, donor funding for HIV warranting
results, and increased global pressure to meet new targets)
have created an environment that can exert an opposing pull
on HIV service provision. The interplay between local and
international forces makes it interesting to study the types of
challenges HIV programs in Pakistan face in achieving the
new 90-90-90 targets.
Methods
Data Collection
Participants
Twenty-nine individuals were interviewed (23 semistructured, key informant interviews and 2 group interviews)
between January 2015 to February 2015. Respondents were
health and HIV experts in international organizations, and
government employees from the national AIDS Control
Program and provincial AIDS Control Programs in 3
provinces: Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa. These
respondents were selected as they were involved either in HIV
policy formation, program management or implementation.
Due to security concerns of traveling in Balochistan to
conduct in-person interviews, 2 interviews with HIV program
staff were conducted by phone, and more interviews were not
arranged. Interviews could not be arranged with the Ministry
of Narcotics Control, an organization whose mandate focuses
on controlling the use and circulation of illegal drugs in the
country.47 Parliamentarians were not interviewed as they were
not involved in HIV policy formation or implementation.
Respondents from HIV programs were recruited by
contacting senior management in the health department, who
subsequently referred us to a key informant within the HIV
program. Further recruitment of respondents within HIV
programs took place through snowball sampling. The number
of key informants (that is, individuals who focused on policy
formation or implementation) within each HIV program
informed the sample size for each HIV program. While all
respondents in HIV programs had a general understanding of
the challenges faced by the programs, however, based on their
position in the program, some were able to elaborate more on
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the day-to-day challenges faced by the programs, while others
on the broader policy aspects. Taken together, their responses
helped in building a richer and more comprehensive picture
of the challenges faced by the programs. Respondents for
international organizations were recruited by contacting
senior management in the organizations, and subsequently
being connected to the health or HIV expert within the
organization. The number of key international organizations
in the HIV landscape determined the selection of international
organizations (See Table).
Interview Procedures
One researcher (the first author) conducted all interviews.
The interviews lasted between 45 to 90 minutes. They were
audio taped and transcribed verbatim where the interviewee
consented, and in other instances field notes were taken.
Seven interviewees, one from an international organization
and 6 from HIV programs, did not consent to being recorded,
and so field notes were taken. We had 2 interview guides, one
for international organizations and another one for the HIV
program employees. The interview guides were developed
to generate conversation48 and focused on the strengths and
challenges faced by the HIV programs. The interview guide
for international organizations focused on understanding
the scope of the organization’s involvement with HIV,
political commitment for HIV across the provinces, and
factors contributing to the concentrated epidemic in country.
The interview guide for HIV program employees focused
on understanding policy evolution, policies towards risk
groups, needle exchange programs, experience working with
NGOs, political support, financing arrangements, and factors
contributing to the concentrated epidemic in country. As this
paper is part of a larger research study, while the interview
guides touched on a variety of policy and program areas,
some of them are not included in this paper (See interview
guides in Supplementary file 1)
Human Subjects Protection
Participation in interviews was voluntary and identities were
anonymized for confidentiality. Prior to the interviews, the
objective of the research was explained to all participants,
and consent for tape recording was obtained. The University
at Albany’s Internal Review Board reviewed the interview
guide and deemed it exempt as respondents were official

representatives of HIV programs who were answering
questions in their official capacity.
Data Analysis
We used an inductive interpretivist approach to coding the
transcripts and field notes, whereby codes emerged from
the data and were not determined in advance.49,50 First, all
transcripts were open coded by reading each transcript line by
line and then assigning codes to sentences and paragraphs.51
These codes reflected a theme or an idea that was being
expressed in the text. The coding process was iterative and
repeated for each interview. After open coding all transcripts,
the codes from each interview were reviewed and consolidated
into broader, more meaningful categories to form sub-themes,
and from them common themes were formed.52,53 The first
author coded the data, and the second author reviewed the
codes. The first author discussed the codes, themes and subthemes with the second author for data validation.54 Findings
from the interviews are triangulated in the discussion section
of the paper using information from newspapers and existing
academic literature.
Results
Key informants described challenges to meeting global HIV
targets, which we categorized into 2 overarching themes of
political challenges and governance challenges (see Box 1).
Political challenges encompassed factors related to the degree
of “political commitment” of country leadership and the
policy and legal environment in which those charged with
implementing programs operated. We understood “political
commitment” to constitute 3 interrelated components,
expressed, institutional and budgetary commitment.
Expressed commitment refers to declarations of public
support for HIV by prominent personnel in a country.
Budgetary commitment is related to allocations for HIV
programming, while institutional commitment focuses
on the establishment of AIDS bureaucracies, adoption of
policies, legislation, and HIV surveillance and monitoring
systems.55 Governance challenges encompassed factors
related to the service delivery environment including health
system management, resource shortages and state-NGO
relations. We understood “governance” as factors influencing
decision-making procedures, rules and norms, in a given
policy domain, around which managers converge that affect

Table. Breakdown of Interviews

Respondent Type

Mode of Inquiry

Federal government
National AIDS Control Program

2 in-person semi-structured interviews

Provincial governments
Punjab AIDS Control Program

5 in-person semi-structured interviews

Sindh AIDS Control Program

5 in-person semi-structured interviews; 1 in-person semi structured group interview (4 participants)

Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa AIDS Control Program

1 in-person interview; 1 email interview; 1 in-person semi structured group interview (6 participants)

Balochistan AIDS Control Program

2 phone interviews
5 in-person semi-structured interviews; 2 phone interviews with respondents from 6 international
organizations

International organizations
Source: Authors own tabulations.
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Box 1. Factors Influencing Achieving the 90-90-90 Target for IDUs and
Their Interconnections

Overall policy environment
•

Low health budget

•

Pakistan is a drug route for Afghanistan and so a large
number of drugs and drug users

•

Injecting drug use and sex work are illegal in the country.
Maternal and child health, and other diseases receiver greater
attention from the government

•

Needle programs are currently operational in the country,
but fall in the ambit of prohibited practices

•

Opioid substitution therapy is banned in the country

Governance challenges
•

Limited healthcare infrastructure, poor regulation and
management across the health sector

•

Resource mismanagement and shortage

•

NGO-state relationship management complicates service
provision

Political challenges
•

Limited & heterogeneous political commitment for HIV

•

The conservative legal environment adds complexity to
treating IDUs due to the ban on opioid substitution therapy

Abbreviations: IDUs, injecting drug users; NGO, non-governmental
organization.

the implementation of policies.56
Political Challenges
Low Political Commitment Hinders Budget Allocation and
Support for Needle Exchange Programs
According to most respondents, political commitment was an
important factor in ensuring the success of health programs
as it determined which program was financed, programs with
higher political commitment were more likely to get funded.
The views of most respondents can best be summarized as:
“If the political leadership is committed then you can get
financing for the program from the Chief Minister and the
Finance Department. If you do not have a strong liaison with
Finance Department, and the Planning and Development
department, then you cannot get resources” (Government
employee).
Almost all respondents reported low political
commitment for HIV and gave examples of expressed
and budgetary commitment to express low political
commitment. To quote one respondent on low budgetary
commitment:
“The government has no commitment as such. A
government is committed when it creates fiscal space for
something. I would say it is not even committed to health, so
HIV is really down in that list” (International organization).
Almost all respondents in international organizations and
across government departments discussed several reasons for
low HIV support, which hampered their ability to effectively
respond to the disease in ways that would be likely to further

international targets. These included, a shift in global
focus away from HIV, the lack of a champion for HIV, and
stigma and discrimination, which hampered political will
to prioritize this issue. Respondents also discussed low HIV
disease burden in the general population and HIV being in
competition with other diseases and health conditions as
factors that impeded attention to the disease. They explained
that the government was especially focusing on improving
maternal and child health and polio indicators, as Pakistan is
now one of the very few countries that has been unsuccessful
in eradicating polio or providing a nurturing environment for
infants and mothers. Drawing comparisons between HIV and
other health conditions, one respondent remarked:
“There is no political commitment, the focus is on polio
and nutrition. [..] We have done a lot of advocacy in the
Ministry, but the Planning Commission is saying that we
don’t consider it important” (Government employee).
Given the recent decentralization efforts, political
commitment was also variable across the provinces. For
instance, respondents also discussed how differences in
political commitment across the provinces affected the
use of needle exchange programs. While needle exchange
programs were being implemented in Punjab, Sindh,
and Balochistan at the time of the interviews, Khyber
Pukhtoonkhwa did not have a needle exchange program.
A few respondents in the HIV program of Khyber
Pukhtoonkhwa highlighted that this was due to the
conservative nature of the Pathans[2] that the program could
not be implemented. In terms of differences in political
commitment across the provinces for HIV programs, all
HIV experts in international organizations ranked Punjab
as having the highest commitment to HIV, followed by
Sindh, Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa, and Balochistan. According
to one respondent:
“Punjab would be first, because as much as Sindh does
realize the issue, it is not a priority because they have
other priorities. Balochistan, well, someone from a donor
organization[3] wrote to them and said that we will give you
the money and you use it on your health. They said, we don’t
need the money, we need to build roads. So Punjab, number
1, Sindh, number 2, KPK, number 3, and Balochistan,
number 4” (International organization).
To triangulate the ranking of political commitment for HIV
programs across the provinces by international organizations,
government HIV program respondents were asked to
report their own perception of the political commitment
for HIV in their respective provinces. To give an example
of political commitment, all HIV program respondents in
government departments (across Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber
Pukhtoonkhwa) referred to the approval of the financial
document, the Planning Commission Form 1 (PC-1) – a
work plan document with cost estimates for a project – to
signal government support for the program. For Punjab and
Sindh, this document had been approved while for Khyber
Pukhtoonkhwa it was still pending. Additionally, a key
respondent in the HIV program in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa
highlighted that HIV was a very low priority for the

International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2019, 8(5), 261–271

265

Khalid and Fox

government as it was focusing on a reform of the health
sector, and it was plausible that the funding for HIV would
be diverted towards these reform efforts. Information on how
successful the approval of the PC-1 in Balochistan had been
could not be obtained.
The Conservative Legal Environment Adds Complexity to
Meeting the 90-90-90 Targets
The low political commitment of the government to HIV
was also visible in the policy environment in which program
implementers worked where the “institutional commitment”
of the government was weak. Needle exchange programs are
tolerated, although not supported by legislation. However,
according to several respondents, opioid use is criminalized
in Pakistan and faces harsh penalties as like sex work it falls
under the category of addictive un-Islamic behavior. To quote
one respondent:
“Injecting drug use is illegal, because it is a form of
addiction and sex work is also illegal here in the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan” (Government employee).
A few respondents discussed that it was important for HIV
programs to take the religious environment of the country
into consideration while devising policy and program
activities. Giving examples of the importance of religious
groups in influencing program decisions, one respondent
highlighted that while needle programs and condoms prevent
HIV transmission, religious groups were not in favor of such
programs as they assumed that they could lead to an increase
in HIV transmission. Another respondent remarked that
efforts to change the legal environment surrounding sex
work in Pakistan, or bringing too much attention to current
service interventions for sex workers, could have negative
consequences for HIV programs and should be avoided.
According to the respondent:
“There are certain things that should be left the way they
are as they allow you room to work. So far, no one has not
allowed us to work with FSWs [female sex workers], to
provide condoms or tell them, ‘this is how you should go about
it.’ But, just saying that they are FSW, half the maulvis[4] will
be out on the street telling you not to do this. [..] So far the
work is being done, the government knows but society doesn’t
know, and let it happen. But, once they find out that this
is happening then they won’t even let this happen. So, it is
more dangerous to address and start flagging those issues”
(International organization).
As with sex work and needle programs, legislation does not
support the use of opiate substitution therapy in Pakistan.
The 90-90-90 targets stipulate that 90% of all PLHIV receive
ART, and achieve viral suppression by 2020, but in order for
viral suppression to be reached, adherence to ART is key.
Yet, respondents described that physicians were reluctant to
treat active drug users over a concern that irregular medicine
use could lead to the development of a resistant strain of the
virus. Most of the government respondents highlighted that
both the increase in ART coverage and physician concerns of
adherence to ART could be simultaneously achieved if the use
of opiate substitution therapy (a replacement drug which is
administered in clinical settings to counter opiate dependency
266

among drug users) is introduced in Pakistan. They added that
while, world over, the use of opiate substitution therapy has
been shown to improve adherence to ART, the Ministry of
Narcotics Control has banned the use of opiate substitution
therapy, despite advocacy by HIV program employees, due to
concerns of drug pilferage and for introducing a new drug
in the market. Drawing parallels with Iran, a country which
like Pakistan has a huge IDU population, one respondent
remarked:
“They are saying that this drug will slip, and there will
be leakage in the market. We tried to convince them that
600 000 people in Iran are on methadone treatment […] but
our Ministry doesn’t agree with it” (Government employee).
Consequently, HIV programs focus on providing treatment
to IDUs living with their families, as they are easier to track
and exclude active drug users, who are street-based, from
treatment. According to one respondent:
“You have all IDUs, and so I can’t even put 40% of my
patients on treatment. UNAIDS/WHO guidelines for 2016
are, treatment for all. In Pakistan as we have a high proportion
of IDUs we can’t really implement this” (Government
employee).
Therefore, according to the respondents a large portion
of IDUs are excluded from treatment and Pakistan cannot
comply with the ‘prevention for all’ treatment guidelines.
Governance Challenges
Weak Health System and Financial Management
Almost all government employees provided examples of poor
regulation and management across the health sector, and
discussed the harmful consequences associated with it. Most
respondents highlighted that ineffective blood screening and
poor control of hospital infections posed a challenge for the
health system, including HIV. Highlighting the importance of
taking a horizontal versus a vertical approach to addressing
HIV, one respondent remarked:
“HIV is not an island and so the work I do is not done
in isolation [….] When your entire health system functions
well, then every communicable disease will be controlled, and
HIV will be controlled and will be part of that” (Government
employee).
A few respondents highlighted that low health system
outreach and capacity had led to an expansion of unregulated
private sector providers, called ‘quacks.’ These unregulated
providers increased the overall level of risk in the system
as they often did not take the required safety precautions.
Respondents explained that while there have been several
positive developments such as efforts to control quackery,
and a disposable syringe act in Sindh, to control the re-use
of syringes, they had not been enforced due to low regulatory
capacity. Referring to one respondent:
“In Jalalpur Jutta, a quack was using unsterilized syringes
and this led to a massive outbreak of HIV/AIDS” (Government
employee).
A few respondents in government departments expressed
concerns regarding the spread of HIV from the IDUs to
their spouses and one respondent remarked that it was the
outcome of poor linkage to care. In terms of resources, a few
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respondents described that HIV resources were only sufficient
to provide services to a very small portion of the IDUs, which
was preventing the expansion of program activities. Quoting
one respondent:
“Theory says that if you want to control your epidemic
then you have to give prevention services to 80% of the high
risk group, now through Global Fund Support we just reach
17% of IDUs” (Government employee).
While a few respondents discussed insufficiency of funds,
almost all respondents in government departments and several
respondents in international organizations discussed that a
more substantial obstacle to meeting targets, as compared to
the availability of resources, was resource mismanagement.
Examples of mismanagement included misplaced resource
allocation priorities and a lack of spending capacity, a problem
experiences by government departments more generally, due
to which funds get lapsed. To quote one respondent:
“Resources are not an issue. I work here, I know resources
are there. Utilization of resources is poor. We will use Rs.
400 000 on a meeting and will not spend on a center. So there
is a need to fix direction” (Government employee).
As the quotation above implies the amount of resources
available for HIV were not in short supply. However, the
processes by which decisions were made on how to allocate
funds were not made in a rational or transparent manner.
Following a discussion of the weaknesses in the current
health infrastructure, most government employees explained
that post devolution, there was a need to strengthen the health
infrastructure through better regulation and management
and by developing capacity for planning and implementing
policy. A few respondents highlighted that frequent transfers
of government employees, hampered effective monitoring of
operations, as by the time a government employee understood
the intricacies of the program, he/she was transferred to a
different location. They also pointed to a need for program
evaluation, arguing that all the emphasis was on preparing
program reports with little attention being given to evaluating
the effectiveness of programs.
Challenges in Governing State–Non-governmental Organization
Relations
Harm reduction services for both IDUs and other risk
groups are delivered through NGOs hired on contracts. All
government respondents regarded NGOs as essential for HIV
programs for 2 main reasons. First, almost all respondents
highlighted that NGOs have extensive outreach in the HIV
high-risk communities, as many NGO workers are also exdrug users and sex workers. Service delivery through NGO
workers is preferred as NGO workers know the hot-spot areas
and are also perceived as being from within the communities.
Consequently drug users and sex workers do not hide from
them, enabling service delivery. In contrast, the government
is considered an outsider who is responsible for criminalizing
their behavior and so they hide from the government.
Second, a few respondents highlighted that as drug users and
sex workers are punishable by law and so the government
cannot openly provide them with HIV program services.
AIDS programs expect to face resistance from politicians and

religious communities if the government is seen providing
services to these populations. According to one respondent:
“One of the main issues we faced was that can we give
services to populations that are considered illegal? As a
government, can we do that? No, we cannot, and so we chose
to go through the NGOs. The second thing is that these are
hidden populations and they do not want to come in front of
the government. [..] The other thing is that these NGOs are
deep-rooted, and are very close to the communities. They are
ex-sex workers, ex-drug users and have very close relations
with these populations” (Government employee).
While the preceding discussion highlights that NGOs are
essential for the government for effective service delivery,
almost all respondents who described the importance of
NGOs for the government also expressed concern regarding
ineffective use of government funds by NGOs, given the
nature of the partnership. A few respondents expressed
concerns that as the same NGOs were repeatedly hired for
delivering services, they had learnt how to game the system.
They argued that the same work could be done more cost
effectively by other newer actors, if given a chance. The views
of respondents can best be summarized as:
“HIV is not a pleasant sector. There are a lot of conflicting
interests. This is not a selfless type thing that a nun comes
and controls leprosy. This is a public-private partnership
and so there are a lot of interests. I am sitting here as a
government employee, so I will want a good outcome but
the other person may not want the same. When you have
an NGO and I have to implement my work through them,
the well being of the patient is inversely proportional to the
well being of the organization, unfortunately. This is not how
it should be, but it is. As much importance you give to the
organization, that much the patient will be neglected. Needle
exchange programs are good, but when I see the budgets,
sometimes, I feel like laughing that how can an outreach
worker distribute 100 syringes in one day? So if he says to
me I went to x-y-z places, some places are just not possible”
(Government employee).
While interviews with government employees highlighted
the importance of the NGOs for the government and the
relationship challenges, a few respondents from international
organizations described that the relationship between NGOs
and the government was strained, and often created a hostile
environment for both sides. According to one respondent:
“This is a problem at both ends and so you cannot blame
only one side. [….] Majority of NGOs that work in province x[5]
[…], they join hands together against the government […] The
government sometimes with a stroke of the pen says that we will
finish your funding […].” (International organization).
In the quotation above the respondent is ascribing
responsibility for the tense relationship between NGOs and
the government to both actors.
Discussion
Using Pakistan as a case, we explored the challenges to the
implementation of HIV programs that are likely to hinder the
country’s ability to meet ambitious goals such as the 90-9090 target. We found both political and governance challenges
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to achieving the target, particularly in the context of the
global HIV scale-down. Political challenges included, low
support for HIV and a conservative legal environment that
contributed towards the ban on opiate substitution therapy
creating low treatment coverage. Governance challenges
included poor regulation and management of the weak health
infrastructure, resource mismanagement, and strained stateNGO relations.
Recent literature on health system strengthening emphasizes
the importance of governance,57 develops a number of
frameworks for assessing governance,58-60 and highlights
a positive relationship between governance and health
outcomes.60,61 Studies have shown that effective governance of
health sector organizations can lead to better implementation
and uptake of health technologies.62 Higher regulatory
quality and strong public sector financial management, core
components of governance,63 are associated with lower infant
mortality rates,64 reduced corruption , and increased public
health spending.65 However, despite the widely established
benefits of governance, LMICs suffer from weak institutions,
poor public infrastructure, low legal capacity,66 and weak
accountability mechanisms.67 The need for domestic
governance is further exacerbated by inadequate governance
of the international response to HIV.68 Governance of
intellectual property rights influences access to medicines in
LMICs,68 yet recent evidence suggests that PLHIV in LMICs
do not have access to high quality drugs.15 Similarly, the
mismatch between donor and local priorities11 can partially
be attributed to the inability of LMICs to participate in
decision-making at the global institutional level.68 Finally, a
number of stakeholders working on a variety of externally
driven health initiatives,69 including HIV, has burdened
governments in LMICs who do not have the capacity to
manage multiple programs, suggesting a need for better
harmonization of policy responses.70 Our findings support
existing literature on the need for better governance across
LMICs, as we identify weak governance of the health system,
poor resource management,38 and a need to regulate informal
health providers in Pakistan.71,72 Our results also highlight
the importance of developing global targets that take local
contexts and political factors into consideration, as the ban
on opiate substitution therapy prevents implementation
of the ‘global treatment for all’ policy target. Our findings
add to the literature on health governance by providing
evidence of a need to improve governance of contracts.
While research on governance in health emphasizes
strengthening health systems73 and leadership,74 health system
governance frameworks devote little attention to exploring
and emphasizing the role of non-governmental actors in
governance.75 Yet, changing government structures76 call for
greater governance of state-NGO relations, as unequal power
sharing and competing ideologies can lead to hostility and
mistrust between these actors.77,78 Consistent with another
study on Pakistan, which identified a tense state-NGO
relationship,46 we find a lack of trust between NGOs, hired for
delivering services to HIV risk groups which can prove to be
detrimental for service provision.79
We also find support for the importance of political
268

commitment in influencing program outcomes. Political
commitment is important for mounting a successful response
to HIV.55 Higher political commitment is linked with budgetary
authorizations,80-82 laws that support distribution and use of
needles,83,84 and adoption of service delivery programs.83-85 Our
respondents discuss political commitment as a determinant
of funding allocations, for bringing an item on to the policy
agenda, and also for getting drug laws approved. Our findings
highlight that while Pakistan did adopt a relatively effective
needle exchange program across Punjab and Sindh, despite
the absence of legislation supporting such a program, it has
been unsuccessful in implementing ‘treatment for all’ due
to the ban on opiate substitution therapy.35 More generally,
overall low political commitment for HIV, a heavy reliance
on donor funding, delays in budget approval, and budget
preferences for other diseases highlight that politics plays a
major role in the effective functioning of the health system
in Pakistan.86 Our findings also highlight that in addition to
political support from the government, program managers
also have to be wary of different interest groups in the country
while devising policy and program activities. Interest groups,
especially religious groups, have been shown to influence
public policy across countries.87 Our findings support this
existing literature as our respondents were sensitive towards
the sentiment of religious actors in the country. More
specifically, HIV programs distance themselves from service
provision by choosing to deliver services through NGOs,
and avoid drawing unnecessary attention to HIV program
activities to avoid backlash from religious groups and the
other civil society actors.
There are several implications of our findings. Our
findings point to the importance of governance and
political commitment for achieving the 90-90-90 target.
They highlight that local contexts make it difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve global goals. Several suggestions
from our respondents such as effectively engaging the
government, and creating champions88 to garner support for
HIV can help in increasing political commitment towards
HIV. Other strategies to build political commitment can
include collaboration and coalition building across different
government sectors and with actors outside the government60
through repetition and reinforcement of AIDS prevention and
treatment messages. More recently, big data and biomedical
approaches have been promoted to garner support. However,
it is important to be aware of the benefits and limitations of
such approaches. For example, variation in data quality and
coverage, reaching hidden populations, procedures governing
data sharing and transparency, all point towards a need to
be critical towards an overreliance on big data. Similarly,
excessive bio medicalization of HIV, has pushed important
challenges of dealing with HIV, such as HIV stigma into the
background.24 Our findings also imply a need for improved
governance, especially in context of the current global scale
down of HIV funding. Given the strained state-civil society
relationship, they highlight the importance of tailoring the
style of governance to match changing service provision
structures. Our findings suggest that as governments move
towards delivering services through contracts, they will need
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to re-think which combination of the 3 modes of governance
– authoritarian, transactional or persuasion[6] – is most suited
to achieving effective service provision.89
Our study has several limitations. We were only able to
interview 2 respondents from the Balochistan HIV program
due to security concerns, and were unable to arrange
interviews with NGO outreach workers. There was only one
interviewer and coder for the study and this could lead to
researcher bias, however, an effort was made to overcome this
through a thorough review and discussion of codes and subthemes by the second author.
Conclusion
This study aimed to explore how different policy actors were
navigating the challenges posed by the evolving global HIV
response in a country with a conservative climate towards
HIV, a large IDU population, and competing health sector
priorities. We identified political and governance challenges
that are likely to hinder target achievement. Our findings
suggest a need invest in improving governance, and to
focus attention on collaboration and coalition building
across different government sectors and with actors outside
the government. Future work can explore the relationship
between different styles of governance and health outcomes.
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